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Recent theoretical advances  in the industrial  organization  literature 
have provided insight into modeling the demand for differentiated prod- 
ucts. Lancaster (1979) introduced and developed what he termed the 
“characteristics approach”  to modeling the demand for differentiated 
products, while Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) pioneered what has come to 
be known as the “love of  variety” approach to the subject. Both ap- 
proaches have been applied to international  trade theory.  The result 
has been a heightened awareness of the role that product differentiation 
plays in trade theory. This work is presented in Helpman and Krugman 
(1985). 
There have thus far been relatively few empirical applications of the 
new theories of  trade. In this chapter, I present a new technique for 
econometrically estimating the demand for differentiated  products.  I 
adopt a Lancasterian approach to product differentiation and use the- 
oretical results from this approach to solve several empirical problems. 
I then apply the technique to the demand for automobiles. 
The estimates derived from this method allow me to analyze various 
trade and industrial policies for the U.S. automobile industry. For ex- 
ample, what would be the effect of a tariff applied only to Japanese 
imports on the total automobile import demand? Would domestically 
produced auto sales replace the Japanese imports or might German 
and Swedish imports rise, leaving total imports relatively constant? 
Some economists have argued for a tariff on all small foreign cars. Such 
a  tax  does  not  discriminate  by  country  of  origin  and  hence  is  not 
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inconsistent  with  General Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade (GATT) 
rules. As small foreign cars became more costly, would domestic car 
sales rise substantially or would the United States just trade imports 
of small cars for imports of larger cars? Optimal industrial policy toward 
the U.S. auto industry may involve subsidies to domestic producers, 
thereby possibly  lowering the price of domestic autos.’ Or perhaps 
government policy may involve subsidizing only one producer (e.g., 
Chrysler). What effects would these policies have on demand for dif- 
ferent types of foreign and domestic automobiles? 
All  of these questions are, in  a formal sense, quite similar.  Each 
considers the effect of a tax placed on a subset of  a group of differ- 
entiated products. Parameters needed to answer questions such as those 
posed above are own-price and appropriately defined cross-price elas- 
ticities of demand. Any analysis of the taxation of differentiated prod- 
ucts  must  estimate  (or  use  existing  estimates  of)  these  demand 
elasticities. The approach developed in this chapter provides a utility- 
consistent technique for deriving these elasticities. While I apply the 
methodology to issues of trade and industrial policy in the U.S. auto- 
mobile  industry,  I  believe  that the general approach will  have wider 
application. The methodology could, for example, be used to estimate 
demand elasticities in other differentiated products industries such as 
microcomputers, audio-video equipment, lumber, and steel. All of these 
industries have been the subject of recent trade policy debate. 
This chapter is a first attempt at solving some of the empirical issues 
associated with the analysis of taxation of differentiated products. While 
the chapter provides some answers, it also raises a number of micro- 
economic and econometric issues for future research. 
In section 2.1, I provide a brief critical review of the literature. Section 
2.2  develops the methodology that is then applied in section 2.3. Using 
the demand system estimated in section 2.3, section 2.4  addresses many 
of the policy concerns posed in this introduction. Section 2.5 concludes 
with a brief summary. 
2.1  A Brief Summary of  the Literature 
In theory, estimating the demand system for a set of differentiated 
products is no different than estimating a demand system for several 
homogeneous products. A typical estimated equation in such a system 
would regress quantity of a good demanded on its own price, the prices 
of the other differentiated or homogeneous products, and several other 
variables such as income and personal and demographic characteris- 
tics. Food is a good example of a set of differentiated products whose 
demand functions are nicely estimated by standard techniques. Recent 
work based on Deaton and Muellbauer’s almost-ideal demand system 
provides excellent examples of this approach.2 13  Ernpirics of Taxes on Differentiated  Products 
For  many  sets of  differentiated  products, though,  standard  tech- 
niques are inapplicable. In the case of automobiles, there are over one 
hundred models available and few models are available for more than 
four consecutive years. The standard techniques would imply a system 
of, say, one hundred  equations with  ninety-nine cross-price effects. 
With so few years of data, the system is not estimable with any degree 
of accuracy. In the case of video cassette recorders or microcomputers, 
technology changes so quickly that no more than two or three years’ 
data are likely to be available. 
Several approaches to these problems have been taken in the em- 
pirical literature. Almost all  have been applied to the automobile in- 
dustry-at  least partly because data are relatively plentiful. I accordingly 
focus on this body of  research. 
The easiest way around the problems posed by product differentia- 
tion is to ignore the issue. Not surprisingly, this was the approach first 
adopted. Work by  Suits in  1958 used time series of total quantity of 
autos sold, average auto price, and real disposable income to arrive at 
aggregate demand  elasticities. While it is surely unfair to judge  the 
econometric methods of thirty years ago by the standards permitted 
by today’s computing technology, Suits’s approach is incapable of ad- 
dressing the issues raised in this chapter’s introduction. Surprisingly, 
research as recent as Toder (1978) uses elasticities imputed in part from 
Suits’s original work  when  analyzing current automobile  trade and 
industrial policy. Tarr and Morkre (1984) and Dixit (1987) in turn use 
elasticities derived from Toder. 
Time-series  techniques,  even modern ones, are not  applicable  to 
investigating the effects of trade policy in the U.S. automobile industry 
because both products and tastes have changed significantly over the 
period  of  estimation  (approximately the last twenty  years).  A  1965 
Toyota is not the same car as a 1985 Toyota. As Toyotas change, the 
meaning of a single (constant) elasticity of demand for Toyotas becomes 
unclear. Tastes for autos and the characteristics that comprise them 
have also changed. While it may be theoretically possible to control 
for the reputation effects and network externalities that are responsible 
for this shift of tastes, it is not easy to do so in practice. 
The most recent comprehensive study of the U.S.  demand for auto- 
mobiles is reported in Toder’s (with Cardell and Burton) Trade Policy 
and the  US.  Automobile industry. In that book, demand elasticities 
are estimated using three methodologies. Because most studies of the 
welfare effects of  trade policy in the auto industry have used elasticity 
estimates from  Toder, it is worthwhile  taking  a close look at these 
alternative approaches. Each is discussed in turn. 
Toder’s first approach is a time-series analysis. This work is more 
sophisticated than earlier work in that it introduces hedonic price in- 
dexes. Toder estimates the following regression: 14  James Levinsohn 
where FID is the foreign domestic auto sales ratio. P,-IP, is the ratio of 
foreign to domestic hedonic prices. Z is a vector of exogenous variables. 
The estimation uses annual data from 1960 to 1974. Estimates of aI 
ranged from -  0.9  to -  1.7, depending on the Z  vector. The coefficient 
al  is the elasticity of substitution in demand. Using the estimate of aI 
and older estimates of  total market demand elasticities, conventional 
price elasticities of demand can be derived. 
There are at least four problems with this approach. First, as men- 
tioned above, tastes seem to have changed over time, since casual em- 
piricism suggests that a foreign car in 1960 was viewed very differently 
from one in 1974. As tastes vary over time, the economic relevance of 
the estimates of the elasticity of  substitution in demand is called into 
question. Second, older estimates of the total market elasticity of de- 
mand are required to convert Toder’s results into standard price elas- 
ticities of  demand. While Toder used hedonic price indexes, the older 
studies did not. As cars are not homogeneous products, it is unclear ex- 
actly what the results of  the older studies by  Suits and others mean. 
Also, the older studies were conducted before auto imports were an em- 
pirically relevant phenomenon. Using these older out-of-sample market 
elasticities to derive the standard elasticities of demand may yield very 
misleading results. Third, even if  the time series would yield accurate 
estimates, the agglomeration of all foreign cars prevents the analysis of 
taxes applied to only a subset of foreign autos. Fourth, regressing rel- 
ative demands on relative hedonic prices does not follow from either a 
Lancasterian  or Dixit-Stiglitz model  of  product  differentiation.  The 
choice of  using relative demands and relative prices of  domestic and 
foreign goods allows Toder, like all his predecessors, to estimate a single 
equation instead  of a complete demand  system. Toder’s implicit as- 
sumption that an otherwise homogeneous good is differentiated only by 
country of origin is termed the Armington assumption. This assumption 
makes little sense from a consumer theory viewpoint unless there is some 
basis for supposing that goods are homogoeneous within countries but 
not across countries. Toder’s first approach is, then, a utility inconsis- 
tent approach to modeling demand for differentiated products. 
Toder’s second method employed a cross-sectional approach to the 
demand-estimation problem. Toder used transport costs to introduce 
cross-sectional price variation. The units of observation were each of 
the continental United States. Here the regression estimated was 15  Ernpirics of Taxes on Differentiated Products 
where FID is the ratio of  foreign to domestic new car sales, PflPd is 
the  ratio of  delivered foreign to domestic list prices,  PC2029 is  the 
percentage of population  between  ages 20  and 29, and PGAS is the 
price of gasoline. 
While the problems of  time-varying parameters are not present in 
this cross-sectional approach, this  method  still relies  on previously 
derived market elasticities to construct conventional price elasticities 
of demand. The cross-sectional methodology yielded generally unsat- 
isfactory results. This is not surprising, since one might suspect that 
variables other than transport costs, gasoline costs, per capita income, 
and the percentage of  the population  in  their twenty’s explain  why 
foreign cars are more predominant in  New Jersey or California than 
they are in Michigan or Indiana. 
Toder’s third approach is by far the most innovative. Although com- 
putationally complex, the intuition behind this methodology-termed 
a hedonic market share model-is  straightforward. 
The model requires only one year’s data on sales, list prices, and 
characteristics of automobiles. Let {a;}  be the set of marginal rates of 
substitution between N  characteristics and price.  Toder posits a log- 
normal distribution of {ai}  across consumers. Next, he estimates co- 
efficients, p, which form a vector of  sufficient statistics for the prob- 
ability distribution of the a’s. Let S be the vector of actual shares of 
auto sales by model. He next chooses p to maximize the likelihood of 
observing S. In brief, the technique selects statistics describing a dis- 
tribution  of  consumer’s utility functions that reproduce as nearly as 
possible the actual market shares observed. 
Toder then applies the estimated taste distribution to a new set of 
available models (differing from the old set by price) to generate a new 
market share distribution. In this sense, the model simulates the rel- 
evant elasticities. Unlike the previous  two approaches, the hedonic 
market share model can, in principle, predict market share elasticities 
for any subset of models. In practice, only an elasticity of substitution 
in demand between all foreign and all domestic cars is estimated. This 
yielded coefficients of -  2.3 and -  2.1,  depending on the price increase 
simulated. 
There are at least three major problems with this approach, the first 
two being interrelated. 
1. The model is computationally quite difficult. Toder uses five char- 
acteristic variables to estimate the taste distribution. Calculating the 
maximum likelihood estimates for p requires a fifth-order numerical 
integration between each iteration of the likelihood function maximi- 
zation. The cost of such computational techniques can be prohibitive. 
Also, some experts at numerical analysis question the accuracy of such 
a high-order integration of a complicated distribution function. 16  James Levinsohn 
2. More importantly, this technique does not yield standard errors. 
For  policy  analysis, point  estimates without  standard errors are of 
limited use. Without the standard errors, it is impossible to know whether 
and how well the data fit the model. 
3. The results of this technique hinge critically on the choice of the 
distribution function of tastes. Toder used a log-normal distribution. 
The choice of  the distribution  function  is  completely  arbitrary, yet 
possibly key to the results.  While all nonrobust estimation  methods 
are subject to this critique, the problem is compounded here by the 
lack of standard errors of the estimates. Without the standard errors, 
it is especially difficult to ascertain whether the distribution function 
of tastes chosen fits the model. 
Bresnahan (1981) also models the demand for automobiles. Using 
sophisticated econometric techniques, he accounts for product differ- 
entiation and avoids the pitfalls of time-series analysis. His goal, though, 
is  more ambitious  than just a  model  of  automobile  demand, as he 
focuses on the issue of departures from marginal cost pricing in the 
automobile  industry.  Because he looks at a broader range  of issues 
than  just the demand side of the model, his results are not disaggregated 
enough to analyze the questions posed in the introduction of this chap- 
ter. While he does not estimate elasticities per se, estimated parameters 
can be manipulated to give an industry demand elasticity (a propor- 
tionate change of all  prices) of  .25  and an elasticity for the average 
product (one price changes and all others are constant) of 3.2. Bres- 
nahan is forthright about the restrictive assumptions that he requires 
on the demand side of his model. The most serious of these is the 
assumption that the density of consumer tastes is uniform (as opposed 
to Toder’s log-normal assumption).  Bresnahan’s methodology also is 
computationally complex, and, like Toder’s hedonic market share model, 
it does not yield estimates of standard errors. Bresnahan, though, ap- 
proximates the variances of parameter estimates in four ways. Although 
variances depend on the approximation used, this does give some feel 
for how well the data fit the model. In short, Bresnahan’s method is 
carefully developed, but it is not suitable for addressing the types of 
issues raised in the introduction of this chapter. 
Finally, a number of studies of automobile demand investigate whether 
a car is purchased at all, and if  so, how many are purchased. These 
studies are fairly common in mode-of-transportation  studies. Methods 
used range from simple logit to multinomial logit to multinomial probit. 
A technically sophisticated example of this approach is found in Train 
( 1986).3  These studies ask a set of questions that are for the most part 
only tangentially related to questions about the demand effect of taxes 
on differentiated products. As such, their results are not very useful 
to the issues with which I am ~oncerned.~ 17  Empirics of Taxes on Differentiated Products 
2.2  Methodology 
In this section, I explain my approach to the estimation of  demand 
for differentiated  products. This is done in two steps. In step 1, the 
demand function to be estimated is derived. I avoid many of the pitfalls 
of  previous approaches by relying on results from Lancasterian con- 
sumer theory. In step 2, I explain how the insights offered by Lancas- 
terian consumer theory are empirically implemented. 
Step 1: I avoid the problems associated with time-series analysis by 
using only three  years of data-1983  through  1985.5 Three years of 
time-series data, though, leaves few degrees of  freedom. The much- 
needed additional price-quantity variation is introduced by using a cross 
section of  (the same)  100 models of  automobiles for each year. The 
data are a time-series cross section, or panel, consisting of 300 obser- 
vations.‘j 
While using panel data instead of only time-series introduces addi- 
tional price-quantity variation, it also poses some problems. It may be 
wrong to regress quantity on price since, across observations, the good 
is not the same. I address these problems using results from the char- 
acteristics approach to product differentiation. 
In the Lancasterian model of product differentiation, a good is rep- 
resented by its bundle of characteristics. Different models of the good 
contain different  bundles of  these characteristics.  With this view of 
product differentiation, as tastes vary across consumers, demands for 
a  model,  given its  price,  will  vary  with  the  model’s characteristics 
bundle. Because products are identified by their bundle of character- 
istics, it is appropriate to control for the cross-sectional variation  in 
models by including in the demand function those characteristics that 
differentiate models.’ 
Lancaster hence posits that the quantity demanded of a model de- 
pends on its own price and characteristics and on the price and char- 
acteristics of competing models. In log-linear form, this implies 
En  Qjt = a.  + a,ln  P, + azln 6, + @’Xi,  + r’Xjt, 
where (Ij,  is the quantity demanded of model i in year t,  Pi,  is the price 
of model i in year t,  pj,  is the vector of prices of substitutes to a model 
with sales Q,, Xi,  is a characteristics vector of  model i in year t, and 
Xj, is a characteristics vector of modelj in year t. 
I  posit  that  the above model may  be  subject to country-of-origin 
specific errors, and hence use a fixed effects model.8 Allowing also for 
time-dependent shifts of demand gives 
(1A)  En  Qjr = a.  + a,lnPir  + a,ln  <., + p’Xj,+ r’xj, 
+ &,JAPAN; + QGERMAN;  + au,SWEDE; +  T,, 18  James Levinsohn 
where JAPAN; =  I  if  model i is Japanese, GERMAN, =  1 if  model i 
is German, SWEDE, =  1 if model i is Swedish, and T,  is a time dummy 
for year t.  Equation (IA) is consistent with a Lancasterian approach 
to consumer demand for autos. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Lancaster’s work does not discuss the he- 
donic price literature, which posits that the price of a good is a linear 
combination of the implicit prices of the attributes of the good. Thus 
in equation (IA), Xi,  would be highly collinear with Pi,. An analogous 
relationship holds for X,  and Pj,.  According to the hedonic approach, 
the price of a good already contains information about the qualities of 
the good. Hence, estimating equation (IA) merely introduces severe 
multicollinearity.  Instead, the hedonic  hypothesis argues in favor of 
estimating the following demand function. 
(IB)  In Q;, = a, + azln  P,,  + azln  4, + ..,JAPANi 
+ C~~GERMAN;  + (YSSWEDE;  + &T,. 
I econometrically  consider both equations (IA) and (1B). In doing 
so, I assume the consumer takes as given all independent variables. 
The functional form of the demand function should follow from the 
density of consumers over characteristics space. Formally, demand for 
a model  is given  by  integrating the density of  consumers over the 
neighborhood of the model. Making the link between distribution of 
consumers and functional form of demand is a difficult question that I 
do not address. Rather, I consider equations (1A) and (1B) as conve- 
nient statistical approximations of  demand. 
In standard consumer theory, with 100 models, 99 models could serve 
as substitutes for model i, and thus 99 prices would appear in pjf.  This 
would  imply 9,900 cross-price terms to be estimated in the standard 
demand system. This is not  feasible  with  only three years of data. 
Again, I rely on the theory of product differentiation to, in effect, place 
many zero restrictions on the vector az. 
The earliest work on product differentiation by Hotelling (1929) ar- 
ranged  products along a  line.  In figure  2.1, model  B competes for 
customers with models A and C but not with any other models. 
Here, models A and C are termed “neighbors” of model B, whereas 
the other models (D, E, etc.) were not. Were there 100 models arranged 
along the spectrum, this setup would imply 97 zero restrictions on the 
vector az  for good B. Only the price of B and the prices of its neighbors, 
A and C. would enter the demand function for B. 
-  -  -  -  -  -  --- 
ABCDE 
Fig. 2.1  Hotelling product differentiation 19  Ernpirics of Taxes on Differentiated Products 
Lancaster extends the Hotelling model to allow products to differ 
across more than one dimension. Lancaster posits that each good is a 
bundle of several characteristics. In this case, if  there are n products, 
each product may have up to n -  1  neighbors and all have at least one 
neighbor.'  I rely on the Lancasterian approach to product differentia- 
tion to determine endogenously  which products  compete with  each 
other for consumers. This, in turn, allows me to place zero restrictions 
on a2  in a utility-consistent manner. 
Step 2:  Empirically determining the neighbors for each product is 
complicated  by  the fact that  while characteristics  of  the goods are 
observed, individual consumer tastes over these characteristics are not. 
I adopt an approach to this problem that is based in  part on a meth- 
odology developed by Feenstra (1986).1° 
The first task in any Lancasterian model is to define the metric in 
characteristics space that is to be used to determine how far apart any 
two products  are. To  this end, let x  = (x,, x2, . . . ,  x,)  >  0 be  a 
vector of physical characteristics that differ across models and Xfl be 
the  n-dimensional  space  in  which  products  are  differentiated.  Let 
8 = (el,  e2,  . . . ,  en)  represent the vector of taste parameters for a 
particular individual. 
I assume that all individuals have the same form of utility function, 
namely, CES, but that individuals differ in their vector of  tastes 8. 
Then, an individual's utility is given by" 
n 
U(x,8)  = c eix7. 
i= I 
The parameter  6 is related  to the elasticity of  substitution between 
characteristics, u,  that is, 
1 
6 - 1' 
(T=- 
The twin constraints of  utility increasing in x and concavity of utility 
in x imply u  E (0, -  1). This range of u  is perhaps overly restrictive for 
the case of  substitutability of auto characteristics.  In order to permit 
u  E (0, -w),  I  take a Box-Cox transformation of  equation (2).  This 
yields 
n 
U(x,O)  = ce,i.p, 
i=I 
where i7  = (x? - l)h,  0 not equal to 6 < 1, 
and i7  = In  xi, if  6 = 0. 20  James Levinsohn 
As I will be working with the case of less than perfect substitutability 
between characteristics, I will, for notational simplicity, henceforth use 
the (still CES) utility function: 
U(x,@)  = ce;  (x: - 1ys. 
i= 1  (3) 
The price of a model depends on its characteristics.  I specify the 
functional form for P(x).  In particular, 
(4)  P(x) = exp(a +p'x), 
where a > 0 and p =  (PI , p2 ,  . . . ,  Pn) > 0 are parameters. 
income by  Y,  the consumer's problem is to 
Denoting the homogeneous  numeraire good by  N and exogenous 
Max U(x,@)  + N 
x,N 
subject to P(x) + N 5  Y. The additively separable form of the utility 
function in  equation (5) and the linearity in N imply that the optimal 
choice of auto characteristics is independent of income. The first-order 
conditions for equation (5) imply 
(6) 
at an optimum x*. 
Equation (6) can be solved for the unobservable taste parameters in 
terms of observables. As in Feenstra (1986), it proves useful to do so. 
This yields 
(7)  8;  = (xl:)i-8  pi  exp(P'x* + a). 
I next define a consumer surplus function S(x,x*) = U (x,x*) -  p(x). 
This function gives the surplus associated with a model having char- 
acteristics vector x if the consumer's optimal choice is described by x*. 
S(x,x*) = exp(P'x* + a)  C [:]  (x,*b)i-8  (xp  -  1) 
eix:-i  = Pi exp(P'x + a) 
Simple substitution gives 
(8) 
- exp(P'x + a). 
It  is easy to verify that  S  is  maximized when x  = x*. This  surplus 
function will  serve as the metric for measuring distance in character- 
istics space. 
Having defined the metric, I turn now to the task of using this metric 
to determine which products compete with one another, that is, which 
are neighbors. While there are many models of automobiles, and hence 
many available bundles of characteristics, there is not a continuum of 21  Empirics of Taxes on Differentiated Products 
products available on the market. Thus, a consumer may find that her 
optimal model, x*, does not exist in the market. In this case, the con- 
sumer receives less surplus than she would if x* had been available. In 
figure 2.2, I illustrate an iso-surplus contour for a typical consumer for 
the case of two characteristics. In the figure, S(x,x*)  is constant along 
any contour and S(x,x*) decreases as one moves away from x*. Thus, 
the consumer whose optimal characteristics bundle is x* is indifferent 
between point A which entails slightly more horsepower and less weight 
and point B which gives relatively much more horsepower and a heavier 
auto. 
Two models A and B would be neighbors if  there is any consumer 
who is indifferent between A and B who prefers these two to all other 
models. Graphically, in figure 2.2, A and B would not be neighbors if 
there existed a model such as C. 
Different consumers may have  different ideal  models.  Because of 
this, there are many iso-surplus contours that will  pass through any 
two models. In figure 2.3, individual  1  has an optimal choice of x*,, 
and A and B lie on the same iso-surplus contour-S,.  Another con- 
sumer, individual 2, has an optimal choice of x*~.  For this consumer, 
A and B also lie on the same iso-surplus contour (S2).  The analogous 
story applies to consumer 3 whose optimal choice is x*~. 
An ideal algorithm for determining neighbors would proceed in steps. 
For every possible pair of models in the sample, one would conduct a 
detailed grid search in characteristics space. At every point in the grid 
search, one would pose the following question: Is the consumer whose 
ideal model is this point in characteristics space indifferent to the two 
potential neighbors? If the answer is no, move on to the next point on 
the grid and repeat the question. If the answer is yes, ask if any of the 








Fig. 2.3  An example of  many consumers indifferent  to  two models 
A and B 
pair being considered. If the answer here is no, the pair of potential 
neighbors are indeed neighbors. 
This  algorithm  will  determine which  multidimensionally  differen- 
tiated products are neighbors.  Unfortunately, the algorithm  is com- 
putationally infeasible for the case of automobiles. This is because I 
find that at least five characteristics  are necessary to adequately account 
for differentiation between autos. The algorithm described above, then, 
would require many five-dimensional grid searches entailing many cal- 
culations at each point  in  each search. This is  too expensive on a 
mainframe computer and too time-consuming on an advanced personal 
computer. 
I refine the above definition of neighbors. (Two models were neigh- 
bors, it will be recalled, if there existed a consumer indifferent between 
them and who preferred them to all other available models.) Amending 
this definition allows me to derive a computationally feasible method for 
determining neighbors to each model in my sample. I take the smallest 
iso-surplus contour containing the potential neighbors as the basis for 
comparison. In figure 2.3, this is S,-the  surplus that consumer 1 ob- 
tains. This is akin to saying that it is the preferences of the consumer 
whose optimal bundle is most similar to the potential neighbors that, on 
the margin, matter. In figure 2.3, then, when I ask if A and B are neigh- 
bors, I use the preferences of consumer 1 and then look for a point such 
as C that lies within S,. If a point such as C exists, A and B are not 
neighbors. This method is economically sound if  it will always be the 
case that if  consumer 1  has a model preferred to A and B, so will all 
other consumers. There are examples in which this will not be true, and 
this issue will be discussed in detail. First, though, it is convenient to 
state a working definition of “neighbors.” 23  Empirics of Taxes on Differentiated Products 
Dejinition: Models  A  and  B  are considered neighbors  if,  for the 
smallest iso-surplus contour containing both of them, 
s(x,,,x*) [=s  (x,,,x*)] > S(x,.,x*) for all models c. 
This  is,  I  believe,  an  economically  intuitive  and  computationally 
straightforward definition of neighbors. It is not a perfect definition for 
at least two reasons. I discuss each in turn. 
The first problem with the definition concerns identifying the x* that 
defines the highest surplus associated with indifference between models 
A and B. Recall that x* is a consumer's optimal choice of characteristics 
and as such is not observed. I  posit that x* is the midpoint of a line 
drawn between two potential neighbors, A and B, where the surplus 
function provides the metric. Since a model is represented by a vector 
of  its  characteristics,  I  find  x*  by  varying  i2  from  0  to  I  until 
x* = LRxA  + (1 -  i2)xP  and S(xA,x*)  = S(xB,x*).  If iso-surplus contours 
were proper ellipsoids, the x* defined in the above linear fashion would 
indeed identify the smallest iso-surplus contour containing A  and B. 
Insofar as the iso-surplus  contours defined  by  equation (8) are not 
proper ellipses, defining x* as the midsurplus point on the line between 
points  A  and  B  may  not  yield  the  smallest  contour containing  A 
and B. 
There are two possible  responses to this critique. First, the iso- 
surplus contours defined by equation (8) are, in fact, not too different 
from ellipses for the case of automobiles. Iso-surplus contours derived 
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Fig. 2.4  Iso-surplus contours with Box-Cox CES utility and log-linear 
hedonic price function (weight versus HP) 24  James Levinsohn 
the symmetry of equation (8), contours are similarly shaped in the shape 
of any two characteristics. Second, if x* was poorly defined by drawing 
a line between A and B, one would expect the method to yield non- 
sensical sets of  neighbors.  I show in the next section that this is not 
the case.12 
A second problem is that this definition of neighbors, which uses the 
smallest iso-surplus contour as the basis for comparison, may falsely 
reject potential neighbors. This is demonstrated in figure 2.5. 
Suppose there are only three models, A, B, and C. My definition of 
neighbors rules out A and B as  potential neighbors, since the iso-surplus 
contour drawn is the smallest containing A and B, and C is preferred 
to A and B. Yet for a consumer whose optimum is x*’, A and B are 
neighbors.  My method for determining neighbors,  though, will never 
account for the preferences of a consumer with an optimal choice of 
x*’  in figure 2.5. Because I find the optimum bundle by drawing a line 
between two models, and do so for all pairs in the sample, I will never 
account for the preferences of a consumer whose optimum bundle lies 
outside the outermost envelope of available models. The preferences 
of these consumers are ignored. In figure 2.5, this envelope is defined 
by the triangle ABC-an  area that does not include x*‘. 
For the automobile market, this problem is not likely to be an em- 
pirically important one because, in a market with as many models as 
the auto market, it is unlikely that there are many consumers whose 
ideal lies outside this outer envelope.  Were this the case, one would 
expect such profitable market niches to be readily filled. 
Buy Model C  I 
XI 
Fig. 2.5  An example of  preferences for which  the  model  will  not 
account 25  Empirics of Taxes on Differentiated Products 
The algorithm for finding neighbors, then, is as follows. 
Step 1: Find x*  such that S(xl,x*)  = S (xz,x*)  using the above-described 
linear method. 
Step 2: See if  there exists a model j not  equal  to  1,2 such that 
S(xl,x*)  <  S(xj,x'). Models  1  and 2 are neighbors if  no suchj  exists in 
the sample. 
Step 3: Repeat the above two steps for all possible pairs in the sample. 
This algorithm ensures that if  1 is a neighbor of 2, then 2 is a neighbor 
of  1. If  3 is a neighbor to 2, though, it need not be a neighbor to (2's 
neighbor)  1. The number of  neighbors  a  model  has depends on its 
characteristics  and the characteristics  of the other models in the sample. 
The actual number of neighbors for each model is endogenous and will 
differ across models. 
This procedure yields the neighbor(s) to every model in the sample. 
I use these neighbors as the elements of Pj, in the demand equation (1). 
Conversely, models that are not neighbors are assumed to have no cross- 
price effect in equation (1). 
This concludes the description of the methodology. In this section, 
I have explained how I use results from a Lancasterian model of product 
differentiation to derive an estimable demand function. The resulting 
demand function circumvents many of the myriad problems that plagued 
earlier attempts to estimate the demand for differentiated products- 
specifically automobiles. 
2.3  Data and Results 
The data set comprises almost all automobile models  sold in  the 
calendar years 1983-85.  Specialty models with annual sales of under 
4000 were excluded (e.g.,  Ferrari and Rolls Royce). Models not pro- 
duced for all of each of the three years were also deleted. This allows 
me to avoid  the problems  that would  be posed  by  a  model  that is 
introduced in  October and hence has very  low annual  sales for the 
calendar (as opposed to model) year.  A  similar, though less severe, 
problem would exist for models withdrawn after October. Models in- 
cluded in the sample are given in table 2.1. Each model/year obser- 
vation consists of the following variables for the base model: (1) sales 
by Nameplate, (2) suggested retail list price, (3) wheelbase, (4) length, 
(5)  width, (6)  height, (7) weight, (8) headroom, (9) legroom, (10) number 
of  engine  cylinders,  (1 1)  engine displacement, (12) fuel injection or 
carburation, (13) manual or  automatic transmission, (14) power or  man- 
ual  steering, (15) power or manual  brakes, (16) air conditioning  as 
standard, (17) horsepower (HP), (18) turning radius, and (19) country 
of origin. All  data were collected from annual issues of Automotive 
News  Market Data Book. 26  James Levinsohn 
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Some variables of economic significance are absent from the above 
list. In particular, data on the incomes of consumers and on the actual 
transaction prices are not available. The suggested list price of the base 
model for Pi,  is used.13 This introduces systematic bias insofar as some 
models  consistently  sell  for more or less  than list  price.  For some 
Japanese models, this may have been the case in my sample.I4 
Neighbors are computed for the 1984 models. I assume that product 
characteristics do not change so much that neighbors change over the 
sample period; I  will  relax  and test this assumption in future work. 
Indeed, computing neighbors for each year provides an alternative test 27  Empirics of Taxes on Differentiated Products 
of Feenstra's (1985) upgrading results. Here, differential upgrading would 
take the form of changing neighborhoods over time. 
I  begin  by  estimating the hedonic  price equation P(x).  Like most 
researchers before me,I5  I find that the functional form of P(x)  that best 
fits the data is equation (4):16 
P(x) = exp (a  + p'x). 
I find  that a linear combination  of the following five characteristics 
accounts for almost 90 percent of the variation of &)-weight,  horse- 
power, and dummies for power steering, air conditioning, and foreign 
made. Dummy variables take the value of 2 if  a car is foreign and if 
air and power steering are standard, and a value of  1 otherwise. This 
differs from the usual 1-0 convention because some dummies are raised 
to negative powers. The only effect of this change is to alter the constant 
term in the hedonic regression. Numerical experiments show that this 
has no effect on the determination of neighbors. I estimate the log of 
equation (4) to give 
(9)  In P  = .215 + .209 Weight  + .0045 HP 
(.123)  (.056)  (  .0009) 
(.052)  (.050)  (  .044) 
+ .I261 PS  + .4703 Air  + .I61 Foreign. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 100 observations. R2 = .885. 
It is useful  to view dummy variables  here as proxies  for various 
degrees of luxury and/or quality. Hence an optimal choice of charac- 
teristics, x*, may involve .5  units of air conditioning. This just means 
that the consumer would prefer less luxury than is imposed by the all- 
or-nothing choice of air conditioning but more than is afforded by a 
no-air model. The coefficients in equation (9) are used to parameterize 
the surplus function of equation (8). While the coefficients are subject 
to measurement error, their very small standard errors argue that ne- 
glecting this error is unlikely to be an empirically relevant omission. 
The only remaining unknown in the surplus function is the param- 
eter 6 which is related to the degree of concavity of the utility function. 
Recall that the elasticity of substitution, u = I/ (6-  1). This parameter 
is not identifiable with the data available. Following Feenstra (l986), I 
posit many different values for 6 and replicate the entire methodology 
from the beginning for each of these. Fortunately, I find that the choice 
of 6 over a wide range of plausible values does not affect the qualitative 
results.  I consider values of 6  = 3, -  1,  -3,  -6,  and  -8.  Only at 
values of  -8  and below do results change substantially. That is, the 
choice of neighbors is mostly unaffected until 6  =  -8.  At  -8,  neigh- 
bors become much more numerous and, to a degree, counterintuitive. 28  James Levinsohn 
Once 6 has been  specified,  I  compute neighbors for every  model 
using the 1984 data.” The results for 6 =  -3 are given in table 2.2. 
Table 2.2, for example, tells us that the neighbors of the Honda Accord, 
model 13, are the Toyota Camry, Nissan Stanza, Mazda 626, Mitsubishi 
Tredia and Cordia, Chevrolet Cavalier, and Pontiac  Sunbird. An  in- 
tuitive way of  interpreting table 2.2 is to note that it answers the ques- 
tion, What other autos did the consumer consider before she decided 
to purchase the one actually selected? 
Table 2.2  Neighbors of Models (8  = -3) 
Model  No. of 













































































































17  18  19  42  44  80 
18  39 
4  10  16  45 
3  I1 13  15  45  52  81  82 
6  21  37  67 
5  937 
12  17  19  100 
25  29  36 
6  26  38 
3  11  16  20  24  31  41  53 
4  10  12  31  53 
7  II 17  18  22  23  31  100 
4  15  32  33  81 
4  13 23  32  57  69  81  82  88 
3  10  20  34 
7  12  1  18  19  56  100 
2  12  17  1  22  51  61  94 
7  17  I 
5  25  27  37 
100 
10  16 24  30  34  35  41  54 62  98 
12  18  39  55 61  100 
12  15  31  40  76 
10  20  31  35  40  76 
8 21  27  92 
9  28  38  68 85 
21  25  28  74 75  79  92  93 
26  27  74  77 78 
20 35  40 
10  11 I2  23  24  76 
13  15  33  81  95 
13 32  39 
16  20  36  54  60  62 
20  24  29  30 
8  35 
8 34  37 29  Ernpirics of Taxes on Differentiated  Products 
~ 
Table 2.2  (continued) 
Model  No. of 

















































































































































5  6  21  36 
9  26  85 
2  22  33  55 
23  24  30  41  76 
10  20  40  43 59  83  98 
41  59  76  87  99 
I  80 
I  50 94 
3  4  46  53 
4  45  52 
20  34 49  54  73  91  92 
10  53 70  76 84 
47  60 73  75  92 
44  1  51 
18  50 
10  I1 45  48  52  70 
20  34  47  58 73  91  92 
22  39  61  95 
17  18  22  61  80 
15  63 70  71  82 
20  34  54  62 92  98 
41  43 64 
34  49  65  67  75  92 
17  18  22  55 56  80  94 
20  34  58  92 
3  57  71 
59  76  83 
60 67  75 
4  46  53  82 
7  68 77  79 
5  65 66  79 
26  66 78  85 
15  32  81  88 95 
48  53 57  71  82  84 
57  63 70  84 89 
41  76  86  98 
47  49  91 
27  28  77  79 93 
27  49  65  92 93 
23  24  31  40  43  48  83  92  96 97 98 
28  66 74  78  79 
28  68 77 
27  28  66  67  74  77  93 
42  56 61  I  94 
4  13  15  32  69  82 
4  15  52  57  70  81 
41  64 76  96 98 
48  70  71  76  89 30  James Levinsohn 
Table 2.2  (continued) 
Model  No. of 
No.  Model Name  Neighbors  Model Nos. of  Neighbors 
85  Corvette  3  26  38  68 
86  Montecarlo  5  20 41  72  76  YO 
87  Chevrolet  4  43  91  92  99 
88  Firenza  3  I5  69 70  95 
89  CutlasdSierra  3  71 84  97 
YO  CutlassiSupreme  5  41  43  76  86 99 
91  Olds88  4  54 73  87  92 
92  Olds98  8  25  27  49  54 58  60  75  76 
93  Toronado  4  27  74 75  79 
94  1000  5  18  44 61  80  1 
95  Sunbird  5  15  32  55  69  88 
96  Firebird  3  76  83  97 
97  6000  3  76 89  96 
98  Bonneville  6  20 41  58  72 76  83 
99  GrandPrix  4  41  43  87  YO 
100  Rabbit  5  7  12  14  17  22 
In addition to varying 6, another type of sensitivity test was con- 
ducted in calculating neighbors. Because iso-surplus contours are not 
perfect ellipses, the linear method of finding the optimal model x* is, 
as noted above, only an approximation. I used another approximation 
and retested for neighbors.  This other approximation  was based on 
finding x* such that consumers whose ideal models were A and B were 
equally dissatisfied with x*.  This approximation yielded the same qual- 
itative results as the linear approximation of x*. 
The next step in the methodology is to estimate the demand functions 
given in equations (1A) and (1B). Models have, on average, about 6 
neighbors.  With  100  models, this implies 600 cross-price terms to be 
estimated. While this is certainly an improvement over the previous 
9,900 terms, the demand functions are still not accurately estimable 
with only 300 observations. I take the mean price of neighbors as the 
observation for Pj,. Similarly, I take the mean characteristics of  neigh- 
bors as the observation for Xj,. Because the demand functions use the 
log of Pi,,  it matters that the average of  the logs is not the log of the 
averages. Numerical experiments show that this approximation does 
not affect results. There are other specifications for Pj,. Recall that the 
estimated demand equation is just a convenient statistical represen- 
tation. Perhaps Pj, should be the average price of neighbors weighted 
by  their  sales. This representation of Pi, yields  the same qualitative 
results, but standard errors on the parameters in the demand function 
are larger. 31  Empirics of Taxes on Differentiated Products 
I estimate equations (IA) and (IB) using ordinary least squares (OLS). 
Because equation  (1  B) is nested within equation (IA), a straightforward 
F-test is used to test which specification should be used. That is, I test 
to see if own and neighbors’ mean characteristics  are  jointly statistically 
significant.I8 For all values of 6 tested, the data cannot reject the hy- 
pothesis that own and neighbors’ characteristics are  jointly insignificant. 
The existence of multicollinearity  in equation (1A) is confirmed by 
collinearity diagnostics following the approach of  Belsley,  Kuh, and 
Welsch (1 980). Singular-value decomposition analysis indicates multi- 
collinearity. The SVD analysis does not indicate that the data matrix 
is so ill conditioned as to suggest numerical error in the estimates. Due 
to the multicollinearity in equation (IA), estimated standard errors are 
inflated. This biases the F-test toward rejecting joint statistical signif- 
icance of  own and neighbors’ mean characteristics. I nonetheless ac- 
cept the results of the F-tests and use equation (IB) as the demand 
function in  the analysis that follows. Table 2.7 presents the results of 
using instead equation (I  A). As  the collinearity diagnostics indicated, 
results are very similar to those obtained using equation  (1 B) (and given 
in table 2.4), except that standard errors are inflated. 
OLS estimates of equation (IB)  are presented in table 2.3. In table 2.3, 
equation 1 presents estimates of the demand function excluding any 
Table 2.3  Estimated Automobile Demand Functions 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
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(.I131 
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,4330 
-  2.076 
-  1.228 
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(.267) 
-  2.27 I 
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(.112) 

















-  ,912 
-  ,529 
-  ,928 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  Dependent variable is  LOGSALE. Variable  definitions: 
LOGSALE  = log of  sales in  1000s; LOGLIST = log of  the list price in  $1000~;  LOGPN = log 
of the average price of the neighbors in $000; D84 =  1  if  the year is  1984, 0 otherwise; D85  =  I 
if  the year is  1985, 0 otherwise; SWEDE =  1 if  the car is Swedish, 0 otherwise; JAPAN  =  I  if 
the car is Japanese, 0 otherwise: and GERMAN  =  I  if  the car is German, 0 otherwise. 32  James Levinsohn 
cross-price effects. This equation is roughly a panel data version of the 
older time-series studies that neglected cross-price effects. Equation 1 
gives a highly significant  total market elasticity of demand of -  .794. This 
estimate is in line with existing, older estimates. Equation I, though, is 
misspecified, as cross-price effects are omitted. 
Equations 2-6  in table 2.3 give estimates when the demand function 
includes the price of neighbors, hence allowing for the possibility of 
substitution. Varying 6 from  .5  to  -6  affects the significance of  the 
parameters on own and neighbors’ price, but the point estimates are 
fairly constant. (Recall that the choice of  6 only enters the demand 
function via its effect on the determination of  the set of  neighbors.) 
For 6 = S, -  1, -3  and  -6,  the coefficient on the neighbors’ price 
is highly significant. For these values of 6, the coefficient on own price 
is somewhat stable across equations and is highly significant. 
For values  of  6  between  -  1 and  -6,  the  total  market elasticity 
(a,  + az)  varies from -  .81 to -  .83, all of which are statistically sig- 
nificant at the 90 percent level. As theory would lead one to expect, 
allowing for substitutability leads to a more elastic own-price elasticity. 
This is evidenced by own-price elasticities (a,)  greater in absolute value 
than the coefficient of -  .794 in equation 1. 
In sum, the “neighbors”  approach to restricting the dimensionality 
of the demand function in conjunction with a short panel of data seems 
to fit  the data remarkably  well.  I  have completed  some  sensitivity 
analyses in the spirit of Learner (1985). These ad hoc specification tests 
include using other hedonic characteristics to control for cross-sectional 
variation. The results have been exceptionally robust to such tests. 
2.4  On the Empirics of Taxation Schemes for Differentiated 
Products 
The methodology by which the demand functions in table 2.3 were 
derived was based on Lancasterian consumer theory. That theory tells 
us that not all differentiated products need be substitutes. It also tells 
us to group products according to their characteristics and not only, as 
the Armington assumption implies, according to their country of ori- 
gin.I9 The elasticities that are estimated in the equations of table 2.3, 
then, are the relevant ones from the vantage point of consumer theory. 
Trade policy, though, typically taxes a good based on its country of 
origin. The analysis of trade policy issues requires trade elasticities. I 
derive these elasticities from the estimates of the demand system pro- 
vided in  sections 2.2 and 2.3. This is accomplished by perturbing the 
system on whatever margin trade policy operates to simulate the elas- 
ticity relevant to the study of trade taxes. This approach is more likely 
to give valid elasticities than direct estimation of import demand equa- 33  Empirics of Taxes on Differentiated  Products 
tions (see, for example Learner and Stern 1970) because it is based on 
a utility-consistent framework for demand. 
Suppose, for  example, that  policymakers  wish  to know  how  the 
demand for domestic autos changes when a tariff is applied to all auto 
imports. To derive this elasticity, I increase the price of all foreign cars 
by  one percent-my  proxy for a small change. This increases the de- 
mand for models of domestic autos that have as neighbors some foreign 
model.  Summing the  new  demand  for all  domestic autos gives the 
information needed to construct the relevant elasticity. 
This approach requires a caveat.  I  have nothing to say about the 
effect of  large taxes. This is because the estimated demand system is 
only a local representation of demand. The system may behave quite 
differently at a point far from the initial situation. This is a standard 
warning in the empirical tax analysis literature. Also, here, large taxes 
may change the neighbors of a model. I assume that the taxes I consider 
are small enough that neighbors do not change. Preliminary numerical 
experiments indicate that this is indeed the case for the one percent 
price changes I consider. 
In table 2.4,  I give a wide variety of elasticities corresponding to var- 
ious policy scenarios. For each elasticity, I also give its standard error. 
This statistic is computable given the variance-covariance matrix of the 
estimates of the initial demand equation. These elasticities all are sim- 
ulated using the demand equation 4 found in table 2.3. That is, 6 from 
Table 2.4  Elasticities of  Demand by  Country of  Origin Using Equation (lB) 
(6 = -3) 
Quantify Change 
Price  Domestic  All  Japanese  German  Swedish 
Change  Autos  Imports  Imports  Imports  Imports 
























-  ,279 
(.036) 
-  ,064 
(.011) 
-  ,376 
(.046) 
-  1.045 










~  I .030 
-  1.43 
-  .550 
,258 
(.058) 




-  1.717 




-  .I99 
.076 
(.017) 






-  1.971 
( ,292) 
0.0 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses. 34  James Levinsohn 
the utility function is set to -3.  I take this as a central case for expo- 
sitional purposes. Tables 2.5-2.7 present the same elasticities when the 
entire methodology is conducted using other values of 6. Those tables 
show that results remain qualitatively similar for a range of 6’s. 
Table 2.4 is easily interpreted. The table shows, for example, that 
the elasticity of demand for domestically produced automobiles with 
respect to the price of Japanese autos is  ,187. That is, a one percent 
increase in the price of all Japanese cars (via a tariff, perhaps) yields 
a  .I87 percent increase in  demand for domestically produced  autos. 
Were such a price increase applied to all imported autos, demand for 
domestically produced autos would rise instead by  .367 percent. This 
example illustrates an error present in earlier studies of U.S.-Japanese 
auto trade policy. These studies used an imputed elasticity of demand 
for domestic autos with respect to aforeign price change because there 
were no estimates available of elasticities of domestic demand  with 
respect to a change in only the Japanese price. Table 2.4 tells us that 
this error leads one to believe that demand for domestic autos is twice 
as responsive to a small tariff on Japanese cars as is actually the case. 
The difference arises due to substitution by American consumers away 
from Japanese cars toward other foreign cars not affected by the trade 
policy. These results serve as another indication of the ineffectiveness 
of  selective protection. 
Suppose that the purpose of  trade or industrial policy in  the U.S. 
automobile industry is to increase demand for domestically produced 
autos. Table 2.4 shows that a tax on all imports has less than half the 
effect on domestic demand that an equal subsidy on domestic models 
would have (.367 versus -  1.187). (Consequences for government rev- 
enue are, of course, quite different.) An increase in a tariff on Swedish 
autos has very little effect on domestic demand; the relevant elasticity 
is  .034. This is because most of  the neighbors to Swedish autos are 
also foreign. 
Suppose that the purpose of trade taxes is to reduce imports from a 
specific country. Then table 2.4 shows that a tax on only Swedish cars 
reduces  Swedish  imports  by  relatively  less  than  the  same tariff on 
German autos. Swedish cars are the most elastically demanded import, 
followed by German models, then Japanese models ( -  1.97 versus -  1.71 
versus -  1.43). This is because Japanese models have many Japanese 
neighbors, while this is not the case for Swedish models. Indeed, most 
neighbors to Swedish models are German, as evidenced by the rela- 
tively high cross-price elasticities between German and Swedish autos. 
Perhaps contrary to prior beliefs, a tax on all imports would have 
roughly the same relative impact on Japanese, German, and Swedish 
producers. 35  Empirics of Taxes on Differentiated Products 
Some economists have argued for a tax on all  small foreign cars 
instead of a tax on Japanese autos. Such a tax would not discriminate 
on the basis of country of origin and is viewed more kindly by GATT. 
I arbitrarily define small cars to be those weighing under 2,300 pounds. 
(For purposes  of  comparison,  a Toyota Tercel  weighs  1,985 Ibs.,  a 
Honda Accord  2,187 lbs., and a Saab 900 2,612 lbs.) While  such a 
broadly based tax might make the U.S. trade representative’s job eas- 
ier, the policy is only half (.096 versus .187) as effective at increasing 
demand for domestically produced autos as a direct tax on all imports. 
Swedish producers are totally unaffected by such a tax since no Swed- 
ish export to the United States weighs less than 2,300 pounds (there 
is a reason  Volvos are so safe), and no Swedish car has a neighbor 
weighing less than 2,300 pounds. 
It  is possible to investigate the effects of  various other trade and 
industrial policies using table 2.4. The above scenarios provide only a 
beginning. 
2.5  Summary 
This  chapter has developed a  new  methodology for investigating 
empirically the  effects  of  taxes on  differentiated  products.  The ap- 
proach  adopted  a  Lancasterian,  utility-consistent  view  of  product 
differentiation.  Using this approach, I  calculated which  multidimen- 
sionally differentiated products were neighbors. This information proved 
a useful basis for decreasing the dimensionality of the demand-estimation 
problem. Using a panel of one hundred automobile models over three 
years, a demand function was estimated. This yielded quite reasonable 
and statistically significant demand elasticities. 
Recognizing that  tax policy often  acts on a different margin than 
consumer theory, the demand elasticities necessary for tax policy anal- 
yses  were  simulated.  This provided  the  first  estimated  set  of  such 
elasticities. These elasticities provide  some insight into a number of 
possible policy scenarios. 
The methodology developed in this chapter provides ample oppor- 
tunities for Leamer-type ad hoc specification tests. Results using dif- 
ferent elasticities of substitution are presented in tables 2.5-2.7. These 
results appear robust. 
The elasticities estimated and given in  table 2.4 are well  suited to 
simulation analyses of strategic trade and industrial policies concerning 
the U.S.  automobile industry. This is the subject of ongoing research. 36  James Levinsohn 
Table 2.5  Elasticities of Demand by  Country of Origin Using Equation (1B) 
(6 = -1) 
Quantity Change 
Price  Domestic  All  Japanese  German  Swedish 
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(.137) 
-  ,559 
( ,089) 
-  ,259 
(.037) 
(.01  I) 
-  .338 
(452) 
-  ,078 
.  I22 
(.067) 
-  .928 
(. 140) 
-  1.080 
(.198) 





-  .491 
.  I00 
(.055) 
-  .906 
(.134) 















-  1.326 
(.318) 
0.0 
-  ,859 
- 
Nore: Standard errors in parentheses 
Table 2.6  Elasticities of Demand by Country of  Origin Using Equation (1B) 
(6 =  -6) 
Quantity Change 
Price  Domestic  All  Japanese  German  Swedish 
Change  Autos  Imports  Imports  Imports  Imports 
All domestic  -  1.247  .239  .23  I  .267  .100 
(.083)  (.046)  (.045)  (.052)  (.019) 
All foreign  .426  -  1.060  -  1.052  -  1.088  -  ,922 
(.145)  (.125)  (.I23  (.I281  (.117) 
(.044)  (.082)  (.190)  (.091)  (.070) 
(.024)  (.035)  (.083)  (.236)  (.160) 
Japanese  .226  -  .709  -  1.568  ,466  ,361 
German  ,124  -  ,243  ,427  -  1.849  ,821 
Swedish  ,026  -  ,074  ,071  .269  -2.144 
(.005)  (.010)  (.014)  (.052)  (.288) 
All foreign  ,119  -  ,390  -  ,581  -.I89  0.0 
weighing <  (.023)  (.045)  (.067)  (.024)  - 
2300 Ibs. 
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Table 2.7  Elasticities of Demand by Country of Origin Using Equation (1A) 
(6 =  -3) 
Quantity Change 
~ 
Price  Domestic  All  Japanese  German  Swedish 
Change  Autos  Imports  Imports  Imports  Imports 






















-  1.285 
(S80) 
-  ,793 
(.309) 
-  ,358 
(.195) 
(.068) 
(  ,206) 
-  .091 










-  1.275 
-  1.636 










-  ,250 
(.124) 












Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
Notes 
The author is grateful to Angus Deaton, Avinash Dixit, Rob Feenstra, Gene 
Grossman, Whitney Newey, and Duncan Thomas for helpful comments and 
suggestions, as well as to the Sloan Foundation and the National Bureau of 
Economic Research for financial support. 
1. See Dixit 1987, which argues this point. 
2. See, for example, Deaton and Muellbauer 1980. 
3. Other simpler examples of this type of methodology are Johnson 1978 and 
Cragg and Uhler 1970. 
4. Demand for automobiles is the most prevalent example of modeling the 
demand-differentiated products. 1 am unaware of any modeling approach for 
other differentiated products that is not mentioned in this section of the chapter. 
5. This is the most recent data available until April 1987. 
6. Note that this differs from the usual panel in which goods are the same, 
but  demand is  across consumers and over time.  Here, the consumers are 
assumed the same,  but goods differ across models, and these models are tracked 
over time. 
7. Actually, it is  sufficient to include in the regression those characteristics 
of  which a linear combination accounts for the product differentiation. 
8. All foreign models except the Peugeot 505 are produced by either Japan, 
Germany, or Sweden. 
9. This differs from the Dixit-Stiglitz approach to product differentiation. 
There, all products are neighbors. 38  James Levinsohn 
10.  The  approach  I  use  to  find  neighbors  when  products  are  multi- 
dimensionally differentiated benefited greatly from discussions with Rob Feen- 
stra. I  am very grateful for his many helpful suggestions. 
Recent theoretical work by Caplin and Nalebuff (1986) has also addressed 
the  issue  of  determining  neighbors  to  a  good  when  products  are  multi- 
dimensionally differentiated. They show that if preferences can be represented 
by a utility function that is Cobb-Douglas in product characteristics  and income, 
there exists a straightforward way of finding neighbors. Using the unit simplex 
in  Cobb-Douglas  parameter space, they show that a hyperplane divides all 
consumers who prefer good x to good y from those who prefer y  to x. Because 
sets of  consumers who prefer  one model  to another (that is,  the  model’s 
neighborhood)  are defined  by  hyperplanes, finding neighbors  is  a tractable 
problem. The tractability comes from the functional form of the utility function. 
While this is an elegant result, it  is  not applicable to the automobile  market 
because the utility function that permits the tractability of the problem also 
implies that all consumers purchase the same value of the most preferred model 
but differ in quantities purchased. For big-ticket items such as automobiles, 
this is just not the case. 
11. This function over characteristics  is sometimes referred to in the literature 
as a subutility function. 
12. While this line of reasoning  has strong Bayesian overtones, I  do not 
know another way of getting a feel for the validity of a new methodology. This 
is another reason why the auto industry is a good candidate to which to apply 
a new methodology.  If  my  methodology  were first  applied  to lumber and  I 
found clear pine-2 to be a neighbor to grade 3 birch, few economists would 
have any idea of how well neighbors are defined. 
13. This is also the practice adopted by Feenstra 1985. In that paper, he puts 
forth the argument that for national welfare considerations, dealer markups 
represent an intracountry transfer. 
14. Implicit discounts due to selectively applied low financing rates have also 
been ignored due to lack of data. 
15. The most recent examples are Feenstra 1985 and 1986. Griliches 1971  is 
a much earlier example. 
16.  1 also estimate this function without  logarithms. This functional form 
yielded a loss of about .20 in the R2. 
17. This procedure is programmed in IBM Profortran for implementation on 
IBM-compatible personal computers. 
18. Throughout this chapter, statistically signi$cant  means statistically sig- 
nificant from zero at the 90 percent confidence level unless stated otherwise. 
Because FOREIGN is a near-linear combination of SWEDE, JAPAN, and 
GERMAN-the  fixed effects, I do not include FOREIGN in equation (IA) as 
an own characteristic. 
19. Indeed, demand estimation according  to  the Armington assumption, using 
my data set, yields statistically insignificant and nonsensical demand elasticities. 
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Comment  Raymond Riezman 
The trade policy issue addressed in this chapter is how the existence 
of differentiated products alters our approach to trade policy. Levin- 
sohn outlines a procedure for estimating elasticities for different models 
of automobiles purchased, but not necessarily produced, in the United 
States. The Lancasterian characteristics approach is used  to reduce 
the number of cross elasticities considered, thereby making these es- 
timates tractable. 
The estimates  are then  used  to conduct  a  number of  interesting 
policy experiments. For example, if  the goal of policy is to increase 
demand for domestically produced autos, a direct production subsidy 
is roughly twice as effective  as a tariff.  This result  is an empirical 
verification of the theme that emerges from the domestic distortions 
literature, namely, that a policy should be focused as directly as pos- 
sible at the source of the problem. This finding goes beyond the usual 
one  in  which  direct  subsidies  are  superior  to  tariffs  because  they 
involve  fewer  distortions.  Here, we  also  have  to worry  about  the 
neighbor  effects,  that  is,  the  extent  to which  protection  increases 
demand  for  domestically  produced  autos  depends  on  whether  the 
banned imports are neighbors of domestically produced autos or other 
imports. 
Generally, it seems that the effectiveness of  any trade policy is de- 
pendent on what is a neighbor to the good to which the policy is applied. 
For example, if the goal is to increase domestic production, then taxing 
imports will work only to the extent that domestic products are neigh- 
bors to the imports. If  the goal is to reduce the trade deficit, taxing 
Japanese imports works if  these imports are neighbors to U.S.-produced 
products but will not work if  their neighbors are other imported goods. 
This chapter provides us with a methodology to empirically determine 
which goods are neighbors. 
The basic equation to be estimated (1A) has quantity of a particular 
model in a certain year as the dependent variable. Independent vari- 
ables are own price, own characteristics, characteristics and prices of 
all other models in all other years, time and country dummies. A re- 
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stricted version (1B) which eliminates direct effects of  the character- 
istics is also estimated. 
Estimating equation (IA) directly is not  tractable. A procedure is 
developed to eliminate many cross-characteristic effects. First, a Lan- 
casterian utility function is defined. A surplus function is defined which 
determines a metric in characteristic space. Given this metric, a pro- 
cedure is  outlined  to determine which  models  are neighbors.  Non- 
neighbor models are assumed to have zero cross effects. Once neigh- 
bors are determined, equations (1A) and (1B) are estimated. I  found 
the discussion  of this procedure difficult to follow. It is  particularly 
puzzling to understand how the heterogeneous tastes are aggregated. 
Another result needing elaboration  is that equation (IB) performs as 
well as equation (1 A). 
While it is true, as the author states, that all of these estimates are 
for “small changes” in tariffs, an interesting extension would be to do 
simulations to see how the estimates change for finite changes in tariffs. 
It appears that these estimates would be robust until neighbor relation- 
ships start to change. It would be of interest to know how much tariffs 
can change without substantially altering neighbors. This extension is 
important since ultimately, the usefulness of this methodology depends 
on being able to extend the results to finite changes in tariffs. 
Data are available  on average  transaction prices,  from consumer 
publications.  It is  important to get this information  because casual 
observation suggests that biases exist, namely,  Japanese cars sell at 
list or above, while U.S.  autos sell at discounts up to 15 percent. 
This chapter has relevance for the Baldwin-Green essay (chap. 7, in 
this volume) which is concerned with why protection does not always 
stimulate domestic production.  The effect on domestic production of 
any protectionist policy depends on which goods are neighbors to the 
protected goods. 
Since Levinsohn is concerned with the demand side only, there is little 
discussion about the industry structure. However, if the industry is com- 
petitive it seems that existing methods would work for an appropriately 
defined characteristic space. If the industry is not competitive, this needs 
some  discussion since there is no general characterization  of equilibrium 
in this kind of model and identification problems seem serious because 
these noncompetitive  firms presumably  react to things, such as taste 
changes, that are causing the demand to change. 
Sometimes work such as this is misinterpreted as advocating or en- 
couraging the use of protection. Such a view is quite misguided in this 
case. In the short run, policymakers operate under many political and 
institutional constraints. Policy studies such as this one are useful for 
helping policymakers optimize under the given constraints. Of course, 
we should also be thinking about long-run issues, but there still is a 
place for analysis that is useful for current policy problems. 42  James Levinsohn 
Comment  James E. Anderson 
This chapter attempts a significant step forward in the estimation of 
detailed  cross-price effects  in  a  demand system for a differentiated 
products  industry.  Such cross effects  are badly  needed for policy 
analysis,  yet  very  difficult  to obtain.  One problem  is  that  for an 
industry with many models, the number of cross effects outruns any 
possible econometric effort to catch them. James Levinsohn’s answer 
is to develop a method for imposing zero restrictions that is not purely 
a priori. I think the technique is clever and will undoubtedly be used 
in  future  related  work.  The  possible  objections  to  it  have  been 
anticipated and  discussed  by  Levinsohn. The zero restrictions  are 
then used to implement a standard type of aggregate demand system 
estimation.  It  is  here  that  Levinsohn  runs  into  some  significant 
difficulties. 
I  have two sets of comments; one on the paper written and one on 
the paper I think the author should attempt to write. The latter is of 
course unfair, but I am going to do it anyway, because the problems  I 
raise are significant and tend to vitiate the type of conclusion possible 
based on the current research strategy. Essentially they involve trying 
to model the supply side of the auto market. 
Below, I critique Levinsohn’s demand analysis and then make a case 
for a simultaneous attempt to model the supply side. 
Critique of the Demand Study 
Even leaving aside the identification  issues  of the next  part, it  is 
doubtful that Levinsohn’s study has pinned down a stable and accurate 
demand system. I see two major flaws-the  failure to treat aggregation 
issues and the failure to consider the time dimension of the demand 
for a durable good. I also have one minor comment. 
Aggregation 
The first flaw concerns aggregation. An aggregate price elasticity set 
is econometrically estimated, and its values depend on both the under- 
lying utility  structure and the aggregation  structure. The author de- 
velops only the former. The problem is that a great deal of the “action” 
in determining the elasticities is in the latter. I  have little confidence 
that the estimated elasticities will be accurate when considering policy- 
induced perturbations. 
The difficulty is clearest with the aggregate price elasticity of demand 
for autos as  a group, implied by Levinsohn’s estimated set. The under- 
lying consumer theory models an agent who will  buy  either zero or 
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one automobile. Levinsohn’s price elasticity of  demand for autos is 
zero everywhere but at the jump point, where it is undefined. So also 
in the aggregate: if all consumers are located on one or the other side 
of the jump point, the elasticity of demand is zero. In the sample data, 
price movements evidently push some consumers across the jump point, 
allowing a nonzero elasticity. But all the action is in the distribution of 
consumers. Without an aggregation theory, there is no way to know 
how accurate the estimated elasticity is. 
Turning to the estimated cross-price elasticities that  are the main 
focus of the chapter, the same difficulty exists. The consumer theory 
of  Levinsohn’s program (5)  does not define any cross-price effects in 
autos. The analog to the usual elasticities is the elasticity of demand 
for a characteristic  with  respect  to a marginal cost px. Each model 
bundles together a given quantity for each characteristic. A rise in the 
price of  a model (proportionately raising all P.~),  given an interior so- 
lution in program (3,  should induce a jump to a new model: an un- 
defined cross-price effect. Realistically, not  all  possible  models  are 
offered, so program (5) has further constraints on it. This means that 
the effect of a rise in price of model j may not induce a jump in demand 
for its close substitute model k: a zero elasticity. Aggregation again has 
all the action in averaging together the two effects. Without a structure 
for aggregation, there can be little confidence in the results. 
The Time Dimension 
The second flaw in  the demand study is a failure to treat the time 
dimension of the demand for autos. There are three aspects of this to 
consider. First, durability and frequency-of-repair data are available 
and belong in the list of characteristics. There is ample evidence that 
consumers care about such properties and that manufacturers attempt 
to respond. 
Second, the demand for a durable good must be modeled in an inter- 
temporal setting. This will have a number of implications. For example, 
initial stocks of autos may be important (do not necessarily disappear 
into a wealth term). Second, a well-known effect of a rise in the price 
of  a durable is that it shifts up the duration of use. There have been 
significant changes  in the average vintage of  U.S.  autos in  the past 
fifteen years. Also, such data vary by  model. There is no easy way to 
stuff such phenomena into the author’s static model.  Presumably a 
start is for the taste for durability to rise with price, imposing a non- 
linearity on program (9,  but it is better to confront the problem. 
Third, it seems to me that the closest substitute to the cars an agent 
might buy may often be the car he already owns. There are two aspects 
to this. First, the choice in program (5) and in the demand system also 
includes use of  the depreciated current auto. Second, knowledge of 44  James Levinsohn 
characteristics is imperfect, and the currently owned auto is the best 
source of information on the potential new auto from the same source. 
Manufacturers and dealers certainly act on that belief in their efforts 
to build and maintain brand loyalty. This suggests another role for the 
existing stock of autos in demand estimation, standing in  for reputa- 
tional effects. 
Minor Comment 
The author’s technique for identifying close substitutes is the major 
contribution of the chapter. It would be useful to check this technique 
with the results of market survey research. One concern of that liter- 
ature is also the identification of close substitutes, proceeding on the 
basis of sampling techniques. 
The Case for a Supply-side Model 
A basic assumption of the study is that the supply side of the auto 
market offers a technically fixed price-quality mix to consumers. See 
program (9,  where p(x) is given. Simultaneous equations bias arises 
when this is not true. Also, policy conclusions based on a tariff levied 
assuming an unchanging supply side will be falsified by shifts in man- 
ufacturers’ behavior. 
It is idle to complain about identification problems in the absence of 
a demonstration that they are significant and that feasible methods exist 
for remedying the situation. The evidence is that for autos these issues 
are highly significant. Folk wisdom has it that Japanese manufacturers 
shifted their quality mix in response to the VERs (Voluntary Export 
Restraints). Robert Feenstra has done some work along these lines 
suggesting that a large portion of the rise in price was in fact explained 
by the shift in quality. 
It is more dubious whether feasible methods exist for estimating the 
full structure. Sherwin Rosen (1974) has a full treatment of the structure 
of perfectly competitive differentiated product markets and some sug- 
gestions for estimation.  He comments that the problem of monopo- 
listically competitive markets, with discrete differences in brands, is 
significantly more difficult. I  suggest that the sort of cleverness and 
willingness to heroically simplify that is visible in the author’s technique 
for identifying close substitutes should also be  spent on the simulta- 
neous system problem. 
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